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Abstract
‘Revolution’ as a historical category has received continuous academic interest and
scrutiny, whereas the regime invented by the French Revolution has received less
sophisticated theoretical analysis and unpacking. The term ancien re´gime was created
in the moment of its death. The subsequent restructuring and politicization of this
concept during the post-Napoleonic era remains largely unstudied. It is the argument
here that the world after 1815 created a number of ‘new old regimes’. These political
systems, which made reference to ancien re´gime inheritances, were not straightforward
reflections of a ‘real past’. They were malleable discourses that could be calibrated to
corroborate the competing claims made by conservatives, radicals and liberals about
how post-Napoleonic Europe was to be organized. The ‘new old regime’ of the nine-
teenth century, though historically grounded, was instrumental in design and made little
effort to resurrect the ‘real past’ to which it purportedly made constant reference. The
battle to define the ‘new old regime’ was not a rear-guard action but lay at the very
heart of European politics after 1815. The forces of nationhood, constitutionalism,
parliamentarianism, liberalism and democracy unfurled by the twin titans of revolution
and Napoleonic conquest were not guaranteed to win the day. Dynasticism, aristocratic
hierarchy, military glory, religious revival, village communalism and regionalism contin-
ued to prosper during the first half of the nineteenth century.
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I
‘Revolution’ as a historical category has received continuous interest and academic
scrutiny over the past two centuries. The culmination of this process was reached in
1989 when Alain Rey published an exhaustive study entitled ‘Re´volution: Histoire
Corresponding author:
Ambrogio A. Caiani, School of History, University of Kent, Rutherford College, Canterbury CT2 7NZ, UK.
Email: a.a.caiani@kent.ac.uk
d’un mot’.1 Rey, in roughly four hundred pages, exhaustively traced the semantic
shifts and new meanings which this term acquired from the eighteenth century
onwards. Surprisingly, the regime invented by the French Revolution has received
less sophisticated theoretical analysis and unpacking. The ancien regime, paradox-
ically, was conceived the moment it died. Only its expiry was recorded; its birth
went unnoticed.2
The reason for this is that the concept was a polemical label with which the new
political elites of Revolutionary France consigned the immediate past to oblivion.3
The corrupt composite and particularist structures that had governed and ordered
the European world since the baroque era were to be wiped away, replaced with a
regenerated vision of humanity. The reforms of the 1790s sought to establish a
tabula rasa that mirrored the state of nature. It was hoped that, from this puriﬁed
point of departure, an eﬃcient and enlightened political society would spring forth.
Since the 1960s and 1970s, revisionist historians across Europe have battled against
this dismissive and uncomplimentary vision of the pre-1789 world.4 We now pos-
sess a much more nuanced view of the political institutions and culture, which
characterized the European mainland since the end of the Thirty Years’ war.
It is not the intention of this article to seek out the ‘real’ ancien re´gime, there are
many ﬁne studies which have proﬁtably pursued this elusive subject.5 William
Doyle, T.C.W. Blanning, Franco Venturi, Michel Antoine and more controver-
sially J.C.D. Clark, to name a small fraction, have done their best to understand
the absolutist world of the eighteenth century on its own terms.6 It would be a step
too far to argue that the ancien re´gime was entirely a ‘construct’ or merely a ‘form
of representation’. The argument presented here hinges on the simple fact that
words, and the concepts they describe, are distinct entities. They have interesting
and unstable relationships.7 Neologisms demarcate the conceptual anxieties, prio-
rities and intellectual battlegrounds of any age. Some historians still tend to assume
that the relationship between ‘word’ and ‘concept’ is linear.
For example, several decades ago, the Italian intellectual historian Diego
Venturino presented an elegant argument in which he claimed that the composite
noun ancien re´gime had been chosen in preference to the more precise alternative
ancien gouvernement.8 According to Venturino the politicians of the Constituent
Assembly did not want to compromise the monarchy, or its bureaucracy, in their
rejection of the pre-1789 world. Therefore, they chose a broader, less compromis-
ing, expression to describe the social, cultural and political world they wanted
to transcend.9 For Venutrino this expression allowed deputies to denounce the
mind-set, rather than speciﬁc individuals or institutions. While this strikes one as
compelling, it is marred by a small problem. There is little evidence that the term
‘gouvernement’ was considered seriously as an alternative to the notion of ‘re´gime’.
It seems, to me at least, that from the very beginning the revolutionary rejection of
the past was not a compromise solution, but quite the opposite, a complete caesura
with all that had gone before. The only redeemable past which the men of 1789
invoked was the Greco-Roman classical world, which was shrouded safely in
millennial mists.10
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The conclusion to be drawn is that, whatever the ancien re´gimemay have been, it
had existed for centuries without needing a term to describe it. Only with its pol-
itical implosion did a neologism become necessary. It was vital to label the ‘thing’
that was being rejected. The revolutionaries of the 1790s conceptualized in very
superﬁcial terms the socio-political order they had supplanted. Subsequently, the
Napoleonic Empire would claim that it had harnessed and synthesized the best
elements of the world pre- and post-1789.11 It was only in the nineteenth century
that a vigorous debate on what the ancien re´gime had been, and, more importantly,
how its legacy could shape contemporary politics, emerged.12 It is the argument
here (and it makes no claim to being deﬁnitive but rather is part of a larger ongoing
project) that the world post-1815 created a number of ‘new old regimes’. These
political systems, which made reference to ancien re´gime inheritances, were not
straightforward reﬂections of a ‘real past’.
They were malleable discourses that could be calibrated to corroborate the
competing claims made by conservatives, radicals and liberals about how post-
Napoleonic Europe was to be organized. The ‘new old regime’ of the nineteenth
century, though historically grounded, was instrumental in its purpose, and made
little eﬀort to resurrect the ‘real past’ to which it purportedly made constant ref-
erence. As Marc Bloch joked in his Historian’s Craft:
So it was that the periods which were the most bound by tradition were also those
which took the greatest liberties with their true heritage. It is as if, in a curious com-
pensation for an irresistible creative urge, they were naturally led, by the sheer force of
their veneration of the past, to invent it.13
Much of the inspiration for what follows comes from Marxist historians and in
particular from Arno Mayer’s controversial book The Persistence of the Old
Regime, published in 1981.14 In this highly original and heterodox study Mayer
stated with conviction that:
It is the thesis of this book that the ‘pre-modern’ elements were not the decaying
fragile remnants of an all but vanished past the very essence of Europe’s incumbent
civil and political societies. This is not to deny the growing importance of the
modern forces that undermined and challenged the old order. But it is to argue
that until 1914 the forces of inertia and resistance contained and curbed this
dynamic and expansive new society within the anciens re´gimes that dominated
Europe’s historical landscape.15
The main problem with Mayer’s work is that it was a product of the growing
insecurities of the 1980s. Historians of the Marxist tradition increasingly needed
to explain why history had not gone according to plan. It was for this reason that
they explained the failure of their prophetic vision of modernity through recourse
to an ancien re´gime roadblock that impeded all progress. The monarchical and
aristocratic foundations of nineteenth-century Europe were too deep for the
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bourgeois revolutionaries and socialist proletariat to uproot.16 The persistence
of the ancien re´gime highlighted how society had failed to evolve as it ‘should’
have done.
Mayer’s surprise, when confronted by the immobility of the nineteenth century,
has been blunted by the revisionist scholarship of the past decades.17 Despite this,
his argument remains persuasive, even if the agenda behind it does not. Many of
the cultural, social and political ediﬁces, which the revolutionaries of the 1790s and
the imperial administrators of Napoleonic decades had sought to demolish, were
still standing in 1815. The biggest problem with Mayer’s work lies in his historical
materialistic approach to the evidence and that, equally, his periodization of
1848–1914 examines the wrong half of the century. ‘Social progress’ may have
been slow, even after 1848, but mentalities after these European revolutions had
evolved dramatically, even among arch-reactionaries.
Another body of theory that has proved useful in the study of post-revolution-
ary Europe has been the late Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invented traditions’. This
doyen of the British Marxist school stated that many of the rituals, practices and
symbols of the nineteenth century were a complex me´lange of historic symbolism
and practical innovation. As he put it:
Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies
continuity with the past.18
Europe after the French and Industrial revolutions experienced bewildering eco-
nomic, social, political or cultural change. Essentially, for Hobsbawm, a world in
ﬂux needed new rituals, ceremonies, ﬂags and music that could disarm the instabil-
ity which the putrefaction of the old order had unleashed. For this historian,
‘invented tradition’ had the conservative and authoritarian function of maintaining
the cultural hegemony of elites over the masses. Perhaps more unwisely, Hobsbawn
concluded that: ‘Insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity
of ‘‘invented’’ traditions is that continuity with it is factitious’.19
The conclusion that new ritual practices were meant to stabilize and harmonize
society can be cherished. However, the notion that nineteenth-century elites and
government created such cultural artefacts out of nothing is going too far. The
dynastic, chivalric, liturgical and aulic culture of the ‘real ancien re´gime’ provided a
potent arsenal of symbols and practices which nineteenth-century statesmen and
politicians could deploy in support of their agendas. Nothing after all is made out
of nothing.
Another neglected historical dimension lies in the failure to consider the pro-
tagonists of post-Napoleonic Europe from a strong comparative perspective. The
statesmen who triumphed after 1815, due to life experiences that were parallel,
shared a common political outlook and engaged with their immediate past, in
remarkably similar ways. As Karl Mannheim, long ago, and Alan Spitzer, more
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recently, have shown, the idea of ‘generation’ remains important, though under-
appreciated, in the study of history.20 Individuals, or rather groups, born at speciﬁc
moments in history, and with a common social milieu, carried much baggage. The
religion, culture and education imparted by their parents and grandparents gave
them a common point of departure.
Yet, human beings do not simply replicate each other; there is signiﬁcant diver-
gence between past and present generations. New circumstances and diﬀerent
experiences mean that ‘age groups’ have very diﬀerent perceptions of historical
time and its signiﬁcance. This is what art historian Moritz Pindar deﬁned wittily
as the ‘non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous’.21 ‘Generation Units’, as
Mannheim deﬁned them, experience history diﬀerently from ‘real’ time.22 The
‘new old regime’ ﬁts this model very well. ‘Generational history’ can make an
important contribution when it comes to understanding the elites of post-
Napoleonic Europe. These men came to maturity during the 1790s; their ancien
re´gime heritage had been utterly shattered by the French Revolutionary Wars.
These events and collective traumas of invasion united them in exile. One clear
repercussion of the forced migration of elites was that many of these grandees were
not native to the dynasties and states they served. They fought Napoleon not to
restore their lost homelands; instead, they struggled to create polities where the
blows of revolutionary innovation would be cushioned by the legacy of the ancien
re´gime.
For these men there was no going home.23 The Revolution and Napoleonic wars
had destroyed the micro-principalities and peripheries of their birth. Restoration in
these provinces was simply an impossibility. It is easy to forget that Metternich and
Stein were born in almost the same place, within the archbishopric-electorate of
Mainz.24 Their forced migration propelled them to very diﬀerent corners of the
defunct Holy Roman Empire. Both, in admittedly diﬀerent ways (especially when it
came to the notion of Germany), sought a future that would resolve the tension
between the heritage of the ‘old order’ and the needs of the ‘new world’.25
Equally, Hardenberg, from electoral Hannover, and the Corsican Pozzo di
Borgo (who had been the Bonaparte family attorney during the 1780s), had left
their homelands because of Revolutionary strife.26 They had entered Prussian and
Russian service, respectively, not to resurrect the real ancien re´gime they had left
behind, but to establish some sort of synthetic world where their ancestral trad-
itions could be accommodated. The same was the case for Prince Adam
Czartoryski, whose native Poland was partitioned no fewer than three times
during the eighteenth century.27 As for so many fellow Poles, service abroad was
the only viable option in order to survive and maintain inﬂuence. He served
Alexander I as loyal cosmopolitan minister, while, at the same time, he aspired
to re-establish Poland as a Constitutional Monarchy under Russian protection.28
As a realist he understood that the old Commonwealth/Noble Republic would not
rise phoenix-like from the ashes of the past.
The best, and perhaps most striking, example was the Greek diplomat Ioannis
Kapodistrias, who rose to become Russian foreign minister.29 His career was
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enmeshed deeply in his ‘Generation Unit’s’ unfolding history. His native Ionian
Islands were annexed by the French in 1797 as part of the peace agreement signed
at Campo Formio. A Russo-Turkish expedition eventually ‘liberated’ these Islands
three years later and brought Kapodistrias into the orbit of Romanov Russia.30
This geo-political coincidence was to have momentous consequences. Without the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars this provincial doctor might well have lived all
of his days in insular obscurity.31 Like many of his contemporaries, the storms of
Revolution and Restoration catapulted him unexpectedly into the limelight.
He would spend his career in a desperate eﬀort to serve his Tsarist master
eﬃciently while at the same time trying to ‘re-conceive’, rather than ‘resurrect’, a
Greece ﬁt for modernity.32 He would eventually pay with his life for the delicate
attempt to balance Greek independence against service to Russia. Kapodistrias
knew that no return to an authentic or old Greek regime was possible (one had
never existed). The new Hellenic state that eventually emerged, after his assassin-
ation in 1831, was an eclectic mix of classical antiquity, constitutionalism and
monarchy.33 This hardly constituted a return to the pre-1789 world, but rather it
established a new past for the Greeks. The ‘generational baggage’ of maturing
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic squalls would weigh heavily on the
political elites who ruled Europe after Vienna.
II
The battle to deﬁne the ‘new old regime’ was not a rear-guard action but lay at the
very heart of European politics after 1815. The forces of nationhood, constitution-
alism, parliamentarianism, liberalism and democracy unfurled by the twin titans of
revolution and Napoleonic conquest were not fated to win the day. Dynasticism,
aristocratic hierarchy, military glory, religious revival, village communalism and
regionalism continued to ﬂourish during the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century.34
Admittedly there was a paradox at the heart of this process. Conservatives
appealed to an old order they had signiﬁcantly re-imagined, while at the same
time claiming they were reinstating it. Such behaviour may strike us as bizarre,
yet at the heart of this lay the power of ‘visionary politics’. The manufactured
golden age became a historical reality that needed to be realized. Invention, reality
and action became one. While such political imaginings made absolute sense to
many of the statesmen of the Restoration era they commanded far from universal
adherence.
Many alternatives were open to nineteenth-century political actors. For liberals
like Guizot, Thierry and Constant the interrupted process of enlightenment and the
resumption of the onward march of civilization were of paramount importance.35
For mystics, future Christian socialists and radical clergymen, the abandonment of
religious faith unleashed by the revolutionary decades had created a dysfunctional
and highly unstable society.36 The regeneration of Christianity, as an antidote to
the political strife left in the wake of the French Revolution, became a major
battleground in the early nineteenth-century world. For conservatives and
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theocrats, like Louis de Bonald, only political and religious society, working in
unison, could create a civil society strong enough to avoid the re-emergence of the
disasters of the late eighteenth century.37 The religious community of the ancien
re´gime was re-imagined as the vaccine that would protect against the evils of indi-
vidualism and factionalism which had infected the social body down to its marrow.
However, ‘religious society’ as recast by de Maistre and Bonald had little sym-
pathy, or engagement, with the ‘real’ Gallicanism and conciliar traditions of the
past centuries.38 Theirs was a romantic vision of community, clergy and papacy
working harmoniously to curb the selﬁshness of the revolutionary individual and
the excesses of centralizing government. Despite its reactionary language and trad-
itionalist leanings, it was modern both in its populist anti-democratic content and
character. These arguments ﬁnd their parallels in the Iberian context, where
Spanish bishops and theologians also defended traditionalism and the community
of the faithful as the bedrock on which a restoration settlement could be estab-
lished. Thus laying much of the groundwork for Carlist thought in the subsequent
decade.39
The most nebulous alternative vision of perceiving the ‘new-old world’ was
conceived by Talleyrand, with his brilliantly ambiguous idea of legitimacy, better
translated as legality.40 For the elites of Vienna the new order needed to be built on
lawfulness rather than abstraction or usurpation.41 There were a large number of
alternative ‘new ancien regimes’, each stressing diﬀerent priorities, available
to political players during the early nineteenth century. Whether they rejected or
cherished the legacy of the old order they could not ignore it. Civilization,
Christianity and legality were all historical processes that needed to engage with
their immediate pasts. To a considerable extent, it was the conservative failure to
delineate a clear and compelling political tradition that created our modern polit-
ical world. This was not for want of trying.
During the Congress of Vienna the ancien re´gime very much played the role
of Banquo’s ghost at the victor’s feast. The monarchs and plenipotentiaries who
gathered in the Habsburg capital were, literally, assailed by petitioners demand-
ing nothing short of pure and simple Restoration. Castlereagh, Metternich,
Alexander I and Talleyrand could not swing a cat without hitting the feisty
spirits of the ancien re´gime. Like Lazarus, emissaries from the Ecclesiastical-
Electors of the Holy Roman Empire, the Republic of Genoa, the Swiss Lord-
Abbot of St Gallen and the unpronouncable Prince of Truchsess von Waldburg-
Zeil-Trauchburg, demanded nothing short of resurrection.42 For them the past
was very much the future.
Naturally, the victors of Leipzig had little or no intention of losing the gains
made under the Napoleonic period. The Revolutionaries and Napoleon, as
Tocqueville stated in his ﬁnal masterpiece, had accomplished many of the object-
ives of enlightened absolutism.43 State power had increased at the expense of inter-
mediate powers, the noble privilege and Church immunity. Kings and emperors
had no wish to lose these hard-fought victories. Equally, they did not want to
clothe themselves in the mantle of revolution either, which denied their legitimacy
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and divine election.44 Decades of Revolution had shown that the public and its
Habermasian sphere was a powerful political barometer, which rulers could only
ignore at their peril.45 The protagonists of Vienna needed to harness the support of
their conservative constituencies in order to win the battle for survival. The ban-
quets, feasts, balls and illuminations that took up so much of the Congress’ time
were not mere trivialities.46 These spectacles were a complicated attempt to choreo-
graph and display the ‘new old order’ for a conservative public. The great medieval
joust hosted in the Hofburg’s Spanish Riding School allowed the grandees of
Europe to pose as medieval knights and damsels, heralding the birth of a new
age of chivalry. The Napoleonic ogre and revolutionary hydra had been defeated
by Christian kings and knights of old. The past had restored the future.
Vienna aﬀorded the Tsar an important staging ground where he could unbridle
his mystical and diplomatic ambitions.47 He proposed the organization of a great
trans-Christian crusade against the demonic forces of revolution.48 It was not so
much this hyperbole that failed to impress Metternich and Castlereagh, but rather
it was the ‘ﬁne print’ that in the end proved problematic.49 The Holy Alliance
showed that Europe’s Christian heritage could be rebranded, not just to assert
Russia’s military and diplomatic hegemony, but also to create a new diplomatic
forum within which the great powers could concert and discuss matters relating to
the security of the continent.50 At such summit meetings, starting with Vienna, for
the ﬁrst time in centuries Catholic royal orders of chivalry were awarded to prot-
estant generals and protestant chivalric awards adorned the chests of Catholic
ministers. Such ecumenical displays of royal patronage proclaimed ﬂamboyantly
that the past could be remoulded to suit the needs of the present. Europe’s chivalric
and noble past was deployed to legitimize a system of regular international con-
ferences which was almost without precedent.
Brian Vick’s recent study has highlighted that the Congress of Vienna was not
solely about high politics and international relations.51 Its proceedings were inﬂu-
enced by the desire of the statesmen present to satisfy opinion back in their home
countries. A much wider European public than was hitherto realized were fascinated,
for divergent reasons, by the negotiations and events that were taking place at the
heart of the Habsburg Empire. The many pamphlets and periodicals published
across Europe provide evidence that clever publicists were involved in sophisticated
attempts to lobby their government. They wanted their say on how the heritage and
precepts of old regime Europe was to be interpreted and refashioned.
Friedrich Carl von Savigny provided the most articulate analysis of the future of
Europe’s past in his 1814 pamphlet ‘The Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence’.52 This Prussian jurist argued with gusto, and venom, that law codes
were foreign to justice, good practice and went against the grain of the historical
development of Europe’s peoples. As he put it in a memorable passage:
One may seek to destroy all links with our history and begin a new life, but such an
enterprise is an illusion. It is impossible to reduce to nothingness the viewpoints and
culture of jurists living today. Equally, it is impossible to transform existing juridical
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relationships. Upon this double impossibility are founded the indissoluble organic
links that exist and unite generations and centuries, between which one observes
constant evolution, there are no endpoints or beginnings.53
In many ways, this gradualist approach could be seen as the manifesto for the
Restoration era. Savigny, like so many contemporaries, was reacting against the
chauvinism of French universalism and imperialism.54 The Holy Roman Empire
was gone, but its legacy was valued, if not entirely rescued, by Germans at this
time. Superb studies, by William Godsey, Brenden Simms and Abigail Green, have
highlighted that post-1815 the jury was out on how the new Germany was to be
imagined.55 Nationhood, Federalism, Statehood and supra-national Empire were
among the many possibilities under scrutiny and which found adherents. The
micro-dynastic states that made up the German Confederation were an interesting
balancing act in which Nation, Empire and State were all kept in equilibrium by a
delicate set of compromises.56
Too often Savigny has been dismissed as a reactionary obscurantist, yet his was
a practical view that sought to incorporate ancien re´gime legal practices and experi-
ence into the present. His was an eloquent call for practice to determine theory and
not vice versa. His pamphlet, like so many writings of this time, was a nuanced
appeal for evolution not revolution. Where codes already existed, they could be
tempered by practice, where they did not, customary law could be improved
through trial and error.57 The state, or nation, was a living body with few redun-
dant organs. The revolutionary surgeon’s scalpel became the assassin’s knife in von
Savigny’s clever intellectual hands.
The triumph of Napoleonic reforms, especially the code, was not a straightfor-
ward process.58 Indeed, in Spain, exactly at the same time as Savigny published his
pamphlet, articles sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine of the conservative Maniﬁesto de los
Persas condemned the codiﬁcation of laws in much the same language.59 In the
Iberian Peninsula in particular these foreign legal innovations had the potential to
unsettle and destroy those regional customs, traditions and especially fueros that
were such an integral part of social equilibrium in Spain. The Restoration allowed
for notable revisionist critique of French legal reforms, and the old customary law
codes found their defenders. The vindication of the speciﬁcity of local experience
came to be the rallying point of the defenders of the ‘new old order’. For example,
Count Monaldo Leopardi, the father of the famous poet Giacomo, dreamt of an
Italy where the culture and daily rhythms of his native Marche would remain
undisturbed by progressive government of any kind.60 He was one of those great
paradoxes of the early nineteenth-century world. A man who could write ‘not all
rebellions are revolutions but all revolutions are rebellions’, while at the same time
encouraging the development of steam power and introducing vaccinations into his
estates.61 Such contradictory trends posed serious headaches for rulers who now
faced the diﬃculty of managing enormous cultural diversity on a European con-




The renewed struggle, between the twin legacies of the ancien re´gime and revolu-
tion, found its most extreme ﬂashpoint when it came to the vexed question of
constitutionalism. This debate was especially toxic in France. The Cadiz
Constitution of 1812 and the Norwegian, Dutch and Polish Constitutions of
1814 all showed that the fundamental changes of 1789 were irreversible. Yet, the
speciﬁc arrangements contained in these statutes were considered either too radical,
as in the Cadiz case, or too sui-generis to be replicated elsewhere. It was in Bourbon
France that a replicable Charte, which spoke to the Zeitgeist of the age, was
created. As the work of Markus Prutsch has shown, this document was to prove
inspirational across the continent, especially in Bavaria and Baden, which also
adopted similar arrangements.62
The Verfassungs adopted in these states marked yet another fault line in the
relationship between tradition and innovation. They made reference to the con-
tractualism of German political thought dating to the Holy Roman Empire, while
at the same drawing inspiration from the legacy of the revolutionary and
Napoleonic eras.63 While broadly similar, Baden’s svelte charter was diﬀerent
from Bavaria’s chunkier contract, which still upheld some noble privilege.64 At
the heart of the charter’s adoptability was its protean character. The document,
as Pierre Rosanvallon has illustrated shrewdly, contained a vast number of
ambiguities and contradictions.65 The brilliance of the Charte was that it allowed
individuals of diﬀerent political persuasions to read into the document their own
worldviews.66 The Ultra Royalists could, and did, interpret it as the foundational
text for a ‘new old regime’.
This document was a royal gift, or octroi, rather than a constitution based on
national sovereignty,67 implying that the fundamental law of the realm emanated
from God and the Crown rather than the assembled Nation. This was not a case of
mere semantics. The location of sovereignty was of the utmost importance in the
context of the political culture of post-revolutionary Europe. Sovereignty was
vested in the crown, but legislative power was shared with two chambers.68 The
aristocracy’s loss of seigneurial privilege was unalterable. In his St-Ouen declar-
ation of 2 May 1814 Louis XVIII had declared: ‘properties will be sacred and
inviolable; the sale of national lands is irrevocable’.69 The king accepted that the
lands of the church and nobility, conﬁscated by the revolutionaries, were gone
forever. This, however, did not mean that these two estates would not ﬁnd accom-
modation in the new order of things.
In compensation for their losses during the 1790s, the high nobility was
rewarded with a chamber of peers. Here the most meritorious aristocrats would
share legislative (though not budgetary) power with their wealthy counterparts in
the chamber of deputies.70 New nobilities were an essential part of the ‘fabrication’
of the new old order. Ronald Mousnier and William Beik have described the ancien
re´gime as a society of orders.71 While this concept, fashioned in 1970s and 1980s,
has proved useful in terms of historical sociology, it would have meant little to the
men and women of the eighteenth century. Nobility, as Hamish Scott and others
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have shown, varied enormously in terms of political power, ceremonial prestige,
privilege and wealth.72
The nineteenth century, through the Napoleonic invention of the Imperial nobil-
ity, would show itself highly impatient and unsympathetic to the old seigneurial
nobility.73 Mere hobereau and former szlachta, on the surface at least, seemed little
better than the bourgeoisie or peasants. Gradually, between 1815 and 1848,
throughout Europe these ‘lords of the manor’ shed their juridical and seigneurial
privileges.74 The Prussian Junkers and Austro-Polish landlords of Galicia did this
with ill grace and only when forced to do so by the 1848 revolutions.75 Elsewhere
the transition was more peaceful. Nobility in the post-Napoleonic world came to
mean titles and prestige rather than seigneurialism. The elder Tocquevilles, who for
centuries had borne no titles, became vicomtes and departed for the chamber of
peers in Paris.76 The partitioned grandees of Poland abandoned, with some regret
admittedly, the concept of a noble republic of equals. Their meaner Polish szlachta
cousins receded into obscurity, while higher up the social ladder the Potockis,
Radziwills, Jablonowskis, Czartoryskis and Zamoyskis continued to be regulars
at European courts and proudly bore their non-Polish titles.77
The nineteenth-century European nobility for the ﬁrst time in its history started
to overcome the boundaries that geographic fragmentation had thrown up. The
battle against revolution bred solidarity and encouraged the creation of a socio-
political aristocracy ﬁt to meet this challenge head on. This was a trans-national
endeavour. Privileges were no more, but after 1815 the titled elites believed that
they were the custodians of the ‘true’ spirit of an ancien re´gime they had both
imagined and forgotten. These titled individuals who proudly wore gilded court
and military uniforms were a notable re-invention of a previous model.78
Throughout the century an ongoing attempt to stay near to the levers of power
was maintained. Injections of new blood came to be seen as necessary, although
the arrival of a Jewish aristocracy in the Hapsburg Empire (and elsewhere) was
not without controversy.79 The titled nobility of this period was a signiﬁcant
re-formulation of the elite political culture that had characterized the early
modern world.
Restoration France was the trendsetter in this ﬁeld. It re-invigorated Napoleon’s
fusion of honour and virtue. The institution of ‘majorat’ was refashioned so as to
preserve ‘inheritance entail’ for the eldest sons of peers.80 As Philip Mansel has
observed, access to the royal court was now contingent on state service, rather than
aristocratic pedigree.81 Even the most inveterate reactionaries like Joseph de
Maistre, Louis de Bonald and Rene´e de Chateaubriand did not advocate a com-
plete retour en arrie`re. For example, the old parlements, provincial estates or
Gallican church found no new advocates who lobbied for their resurrection.82
Despite their rhetoric of restoration, arch-conservatives could be surprisingly
fresh in their approach to political problems.
One of the old-new problems that emerged during the ﬁrst few years of the
French Restoration was a renewed struggle between crown and nobility.83 In
1816 the king had appointed a moderate ministry to restrain the excesses of the
Caiani 447
ultra-royalist chamber of deputies elected after Napoleon’s hundred days.84 The
Ultras, extremist royalist nobles, prided themselves in being ‘plus royaliste que le
roi’. The most articulate partisan of this party, was Chateaubriand, who in his
pamphlet the ‘Monarchie selon la charte 1816’, provided one of the most compelling
arguments that government should be bound by the wishes of a parliamentary
majority. According to him:
It follows, that under a constitutional monarchy, it is public opinion that is the source
of legitimacy for the ministry, principium et fons, In consequence it[s power] derives
from this [source]; the ministry must emerge from [the] majority of the chamber of
deputies, because the deputies are the principal agents of public opinion.85
Despite his conservative agenda, Chateaubriand advocated the modern principle of
a government’s parliamentary accountability. Ultimately, the chamber’s large
ultra-royalist majority made them the perfect representatives of the ‘new old
regime’.86
Thus, in this way a complete return to the past was avoided while the spirit of
the ancien re´gime was maintained. The problem for conservatives, like
Chateaubriand, was that they were very vague and inconsistent when it came to
deﬁning the key concepts of their political culture. Their approach to theory was
essentially reactive. Opportunistically, they coated their factional self-interest in
theoretical drag ex post facto. The slogans of tradition, legitimacy and order all
remained rather nebulous when it came to ultra-royalist political thought. This was
to prove a decided disadvantage when it came to confronting their liberal oppon-
ents. Intellectuals like Constant, Guizot and Royer-Collard, during the 1820s, built
up a formidable conceptual and historical arsenal with which to counter their
enemies. They were highly articulate, and when it came to debate they ran rings
round the Ultras. These liberal politicians, in many ways, invented the wicked
depraved pre-1789 world so familiar to the popular imagination today. As
Guizot put it in his fourteenth lecture on the ‘History of European Civilization’:
Upon the continent, the progress of civilization has been much less complex and
complete [when compared to England]. The various elements of society – the religious
and civil orders – monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, have developed themselves,
not together and abreast, but in succession. Each principle, each system has had after
a certain manner, its turn.87
Guizot lamented that, unlike England in 1688, mixed government had not come
into being in France peacefully. Freedom of the individual was still constrained by
monarchical, aristocratic and ecclesiastic shackles that dated from before 1789.
Few ultra-royalists felt the need to defend or propagate a positive public image
of the ancien re´gime that they had internalized in their youth. This left the stage free
for others to describe how dark and dismal life had been pre-1789.88 France was
not the only place in Europe where conservatives were struggling to defend their
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vision of the old regime. When confronted with the great reform act of 1832, Peelite
Tories appealed to something they called ‘old England’.89 Like their French ultra-
royalist counterparts, they failed singularly to deﬁne what this mythical golden age
meant in practice.90
It was Stendland, perhaps, who best epitomised this black legend in his novel
The Chaterhouse of Parma. He describes his anti-hero, Count Mosca della Rovere
Sorezana in a highly evocative fashion:
Mosca was a man who might have been forty or forty-ﬁve. He had large features, no
trace of self-importance and a simple, cheerful expression which told in his favour. He
would have been very handsome too, had not a quirk of his prince not forced him to
wear powder in his hair as a guarantee of his having the right political ideas.91
A sparkling conversationalist, sexually licentious, corrupt and venal, Count Mosca,
was not just the most attractive character in the novel, he was the incarnation of the
ancien re´gime aristocrat. The clouds of hair powder encountered in the novel are
the ectoplasm of the evil ancien re´gime. The radical Stendhal was not just con-
demning the corrupt past but he lampooned the equally iniquitous post-heroic
present. Mosca was not just a man of pre-1789 values he was the living embodi-
ment of the ‘new old regime’.92 From his exile, the former Emperor also partici-
pated with relish in the formulation of a liberal black legend of the ancien re´gime:
In France the nobles represented the Franks and Burgundians, while the rest of the
nation were the Gauls. The feudal regime introduced and established the principle that
all lands had a lord. Priests and nobles exercised all political rights; the peasants were
enserfed to their domains. The march of civilization and enlightenment liberated the
people.93
Cleverly from Saint Helena, Napoleon actively forgot the authoritarianism of
his Empire and reinvented himself as the champion of liberal values. The legacy
of Revolution and Empire were the sole defence against a new ancien re´gime
that despite its claims to benignity was anti-historical according to Bonapartists
and those who identiﬁed with the progress of civilization. In the same way liberals
in the chambers accused conservatives not of seeking a harmonious synthesis
between old and new but of wanting to plunge France under the shadow of the
Bastille.
One of the more interesting ﬁgures in this debate was Regnault de Warin, the
Girouette (turncoat) par excellence,94 who in 1820 published a ‘dictionary of the
ancien re´gime’.95 After having been a Jacobin, a latter day hagiographer of Louis
XVI, an ardent Bonapartist and a Restoration royalist, Warin discovered his inner
liberal soul.96 In a confused and disorientating alphabetical compendium, he listed
the abuses of feudalism and the old nobility with relish.97 Wisely enough, the
institution of monarchy was omitted from his denunciation of the past. This
was a wise move because shortly after publication of the dictionary, the duc
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de Berry was assassinated. The fallout from the murder of this Bourbon prince was
signiﬁcant. The moderate government of Decazes fell and reaction against subver-
sive elements in society followed.98 Despite it stylistic ﬂaws and poor prose Warin’s
text seems to have been fairly popular. The liberals triumphed with the advent of
the July Monarchy and this regime was very sympathetic to the myth of ‘bad old
regime’. In 1832 Warin’s dictionary received a second augmented edition.99 Shortly
after this, his hitherto indefatigable pen succumbed ﬁnally to the twin pressures of
decrepitude and penury.
IV
When it came to ordering peasant communities and managing regional diversity,
attempts to salvage and recast elements of the old regime for the new gave rise to
decidedly mixed results. Beyond the Olympian summits of the world of political
elites, the battle to deﬁne the ‘new old regime’ reverberated to the very bottom of
the social pyramid. The original research of Bernard Rulof on Languedoc and that
of Tracy Dennison on the serfs of Voskashnikovo highlights that peasants and
their lords faced dilemmas that were not dissimilar to those confronting their gov-
ernments.100 The feudal past and the modern agricultural present needed to ﬁnd a
new synthesis post-1815. Landowners across Europe desperately tried to manage
the transition from paternalism to popular politics as best they could.101 Noble-
funded drinking societies and legitimist rural clubs tried to sacralize the bond
between peasant communities and the ‘natural’ leadership provided by local
squires.102 These appeals to heritage, hierarchy and tradition actually camouﬂaged
political processes that were highly disruptive.
It was the beginning of a long apprenticeship in politics for Europe’s peas-
ants.103 Such politicization was hardly harmonious, as central government’s intru-
sions de-stabilized the customs and rhythms of rural life. A good example can be
found in Sahlins’ study of the guerre de Demoiselles.104 Here ‘Charivaris’ and other
atavistic forms of resistance were resurrected to ﬁght the very unwelcome forestry
codes which struck brutally at the very heart of the peasant community.105 Violent
clashes between traditional peasants and the might of the state exposed that the
understanding of ‘new old regimes’ was contested ground. The stakes in deﬁning
how the legacy of the old order shaped the present were high for both conservatives
and radicals.
After 1848, some revolutionaries, realizing the growing engagement of the peas-
antry with politics, refashioned the legacy of the old order and its traditions of
peasant communalism to suit more radical objectives. One need only think of
Alexander Herzen’s idyllic and highly idealized portrayal of the Russian Mir.
For this revolutionary, Russia was not backward but better suited than other
European peoples for communism thanks to its traditional rural structures
which fostered common ownership and communal self-government.106 The peasant
communities of the old Mir (or village) made serfs ideally positioned to meet the
challenges of modernity head-on. It could be argued that such debates on the role
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of heritage in organizing peasant communities was another, perhaps more pastoral,
form of ‘new old regime’.
Equally, the manner in which respect for regionalism could be reconciled with
strong government was an issue that deeply challenged the post-Napoleonic world.
Sir John Elliott famously described the style of rulership in the early modern world
as one of composite monarchy.107 Put simply, in order to incorporate inherited and
conquered provinces into their kingdoms, monarchs bestowed signiﬁcant regional
and ﬁscal privileges and autonomies on their subjects. After the failed Napoleonic
experiment of integrating Europe under a uniﬁed system of administration, com-
posite monarchies experienced a second lease of life across the continent. The best
known examples were Sardinia-Piedmont, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands
and the Habsburg Empire.
On the surface this was an old solution to an old problem. Yet the legacy of the
Napoleonic wars had deeply changed Europe and created new expectations.
Restoration governments had a delicate balancing act to accomplish.108 They
inherited from Napoleonic France administrative reforms and institutions which
far exceeded the ambitions of most enlightened absolutists from the ancien re´gime.
At the same time, French occupation and the imposition of cultural imperialism
had awakened a sense that linguistic and cultural groups had their own rights.
Managing such diversity in a Europe of powerful, centralized and reforming mon-
archies could prove insoluble. Indeed, the House of Nassau desperately sought to
appeal to a common Burgundian past to justify the Netherlandish present.109
A barrage of newspapers, educational policies and administrative reforms failed
to convince its Belgian subjects that more united than separated them from their
Dutch neighbours. The linguistic and administrative policies of the Dutch United
Kingdom could not bridge the deep historic and religious antipathies that divided
south from north in the Low Countries.110 The ghosts of the defunct Austrian
Netherlands made the construction of a shared Dutch past unconvincing. In
1831 the Belgians corrected this by rising up in revolution and creating a ‘new
old regime’ which ﬁtted their context.
The kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia experienced similar issues. Even its name
belied the fact that it was fabricated simply by fusing two Italian provinces whose
culture, society and economies shared only a common border. Unlike the
Habsburg erbla¨nde, which still possessed provincial estates, feudal law and,
where pedigree dictated, access to public oﬃce, Lombardy-Venetia retained
much of its Napoleonic ediﬁce.111 The Habsburgs tried with determination to
fuse their dynastic history with the legacy of Napoleon into an eclectic ‘new old
regime’. They tried, through strong educational policies (almost a third of
the entire Empire’s educational budget), to teach Italians to be Kaisertreue.112
The Coronation of Ferdinand I in Milan in 1838 marked the pinnacle of the
Austrian penchant for inventing traditions en masse. A barrage of spectacles, rit-
uals, traditions, gestures and costumes were created for the occasion.113 Despite
their ancien re´gime appearance they owed more to Napoleon than to the history of
the Habsburg dynasty. As in the best art forgeries, signiﬁcant layers of varnish were
Caiani 451
superimposed in the hope that this fake patina, giving the appearance of centuries
of ageing, would fool spectators. It would be harsh to say that this experiment was
doomed to failure as the Habsburg deployed very signiﬁcant resources in trying to
accommodate these Italian provinces into their Empire. The cries of ‘viva
Radetsky’ of some Lombard peasants during the 1848 revolution highlight that
at least some felt loyalty to this newly minted old order.114
Nowhere more so than in Spain did the quest to accommodate the legacies of
antiguo re´gimen regionalism prove so bloody and divisive. Carlism, and its wars,
did not translate straightforwardly into a battle between progressives and reaction-
aries.115 Such a description belies the stunning complexities and realities that lay
behind so much of both Cristino and Carlist thinking. On the face of it this was a
dynastic dispute. Those who supported the French-style Salic law of male succes-
sion, imported by Philip V in 1715, bitterly opposed those who defended older
Visigothic traditions of female inheritance.116 It is important to note that both of
these positions were historically grounded. They proposed competing visions of
how the legacy of the ancien re´gime could re-structure Spain’s future.
The liberal Cristinos appealed to the heroic example of the Comuneros revolt
and Spain’s chequered history of administrative reform,117 whereas the counter-
revolutionary Carlists were an eclectic agglutination of ultramontane theocrats,
defenders of regional ‘fueros’, re-interpreters of the leyes fundamentales of the
kingdom and admirers of Charles III’s enlightened absolutism.118 The nation
that had most resisted Napoleon’s administrative system tore itself apart over
what to retain from the past and what to borrow from their former enemy. Here
as elsewhere in Europe the deﬁnition of how the heritage of past should shape the
future was up for grabs. Carlos Marı´a Isidro and his Carlist supports appealed to a
romantic social compact symbolized by the A´rbol de Guernica.119 It was a vision of
history in which provinces, traditional Cortes and monarchs had reached a mutu-
ally beneﬁcial system of regional autonomies (fueros) that were at the heart of their
prosperity. It was no straightforward vision of Restoration because, as Alexandra
Wilhelmsen has shown, words like reform and renovation were buried deep inside
Carlist rhetoric too.120 They did not merely re-present the antiguo re´gimen but
wanted to improve on it.
This struggle in Spain broke the unity of the Vienna settlement (at least tem-
porarily). The liberal powers of the West formed a quadruple alliance in 1834 to
resist the Mu¨nchengra¨tz convention of the Eastern Empires.121 In the English-
speaking world this is a largely forgotten story, hidden beneath an overly simplistic
narrative of reaction versus progress. The ﬁrst Carlist war highlighted the vital
importance of mastering the immediate past in order to organize the present. All
of Europe watched, and sent money, arms and volunteers to Iberia. As far Russia,
Nikolai Gogol nervously joked about the hispanomania of current aﬀairs in his
‘diary of a madman’.122 Such levity tried to distract attention from the fact that
Spain was a vital test case when it came to deﬁning which conception of the ‘new
old regime’ would win the day. Was it to be the cherished (and unrealistic) con-
servative polity that tried to reconcile regional diversity with strong government,
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or was it to be the liberal black legend that had refashioned the ancien re´gime into
an age of corruption and superstition which threatened to plunge European civil-
ization back into obscurantism?
This article is part of a wider and ongoing research project, and its argument,
though still evolving, claims to make a contribution to the historiography of the
Restoration. Building on the important work of Waresquiel, Broers, Laven and
Riall, it seeks to move beyond sterile interpretations that depict Europe at this time
as if it were a car in reverse gear. The dichotomy of progress versus reaction,
though not without its uses, does tend to make readings of this period overly
teleological and laden with anachronistic value judgements. The post-Napoleonic
world has been painted, unhelpfully, as a frustrating waiting room before Europe
entered a more interesting age of democracy and nationalism. Such a dismissive
view caricatures an age that was rich in political thought, strife and cultural innov-
ation. Focusing simply on the struggle against the Revolution after 1815 is to
examine only half of the picture.
The ancien re´gime and its legacy was interpreted and reworked constantly
throughout these decades. It was described simultaneously as a model and a
ruin – paradoxically invoked by some as a blueprint and by others as a dangerous
obstacle to be avoided. Behind these debates nearly all accepted that a complete
retour en arrie`re was impossible. Conservatives, liberals and radicals all fashioned
their own alternative versions of new-old regimes that would legitimize their pol-
itical agenda and strengthen their dreams of a stable future. It could be speculated
that many of the challenges and debates of this neglected period ﬁnd, admittedly
imperfect, parallels with our own age. Managing diversity in an interconnected
world, ﬁnding a stable relationship between popular and elite politics, the desir-
ability of foreign intervention and establishing legitimacy in the realm of inter-
national relations are issues that confronted Chancellor Metternich as they today
face Chancellor Merkel. The ghosts of the ancien re´gime made an impressive con-
tribution to the structure and reshaping of politics after 1815. Perhaps we neglect
the spirits of the post-Napoleonic age at our own peril.
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